Category Archives: Policy

Connecticut State Budget Process

The Connecticut General Assembly generates a two-year (biennial) budget every odd-numbered year which begins in the Executive Branch, when the governor each state agency to prepare draft budgets for the following biennium. Over several months the governor’s budget office, the Office of Policy & Management (OPM), compiles this information, makes changes, and then works to match the agencies’ spending projections with revenue.

The result, often referred to as the ‘governor’s budget,’ is delivered to the General Assembly in a formal address by the governor in early February. The annual budget address often includes policy initiatives, spending proposals, and vehicles through which additional revenue may be generated. In the address, the governor identifies his priorities for the biennium.

When the legislature convenes, members of the General Assembly go through a similar process. Joint Committees (consisting of state senators and representatives), chiefly, the Finance, Revenue, and Bonding Committee oversee the revenue side of the state budget, which includes fees and taxes. On the spending side, the Appropriations Committee handles matters regarding state agency budgets and other state spending. When the Appropriations and Finance Committees approve a budget, it is often different from the governor’s. The two versions are negotiated into the final budget language and the budget must be voted on and passed by both the House and Senate and signed into law by the governor.

Aerial view of the Connecticut State Capitol Building in Hartford.    (AP Photo/Douglas Healey)

KEY DATES           

May through July:
Agencies/commissioners prepare biennial budget projections.

June 30/July 1:
Fiscal Year ends/New Fiscal Year begins.

August 1:
State agencies and commissioners budget request instructions

September 1:
Biennial budget requests due.

September through January:
OPM reviews recommendations and prepares proposed ‘governor’s budget.

February:
Governor transmits budget to General Assembly.

February through May:
General Assembly convenes, holds hearings, debates and makes adjustments.

May through June: 
Reconciliation of governor’s budget with General Assembly budget.[1]

SPENDING

State spending is roughly $10,000 per household, while the state debt per capita is $27,539.70.

The current fiscal year projects spending of nearly $3 billion in direct aid to the state’s cities and towns through a variety of grant programs. The vast majority of that funding is channeled through the Education Cost Sharing (ECS) grant to help finance public education. Other primary municipal grant programs include: the Excess Cost Grant, designed to mitigate the high cost of special education mandates; Town Aid Road (TAR) Fund, which helps maintain local streets and roads; and Payments In Lieu of Taxes (PILOT), which compensates local governments for hosting tax-exempt institutions like not-for-profit hospitals and state-owned buildings that don’t pay local property taxes.  A popular grant, The Small Town Economic Assistance Program (STEAP) funds economic development, community conservation and quality of life projects in rural and suburban towns.

Municipal grants are awarded on a sliding scale based upon criteria including the economic status of the city or town, the income level of its residents, and the worthiness of specific infrastructure improvement projects.”

Medicaid accounts for much of Connecticut’s spending and is currently driving a budget shortfall, according to DSS spokesperson David Dearborn. As a result, the biggest cuts are coming from Medicaid to fix that deficit. Governor Dannel Malloy announced $170,444,693 in statewide budget rescissions this past week; $32 million of it is from the Department of Social Services, $8 million from the Department of Education and $1 million from the Department of Economic and Community Development. The biggest cuts from DSS include housing and homeless services which is close to $3 million and $5 million from TANF. However, according to DSS spokesperson David Dearborn the cuts represent real services with real effect on people from Medicaid. Those budget cuts are intended to help slash an estimated $365 million from the state deficit.

Since 1978 Connecticut has had a Budget Reserve Fund, more commonly referred to as the Rainy Day Fund. The fund was created to help close fiscal year-end budget gaps. The Rainy Day Fund is currently depleted, when it was used to help balance the FY 10-11 budget. In the past few years, state government has spent more than $900 million in emergency federal stimulus aid as well as a nearly $1.4 billion emergency budget reserve, and the entirety Rainy Day Fund. Connecticut operates from a common pool that mingles tax revenues, federal grants and receipts from fees and licenses with borrowed funds. With the governor’s approval, state law permits the treasurer’s office to temporarily transfer funds between operating and capital programs, which has done so in emergencies when bills exceed tax and other operating fund receipts.

In regards to the current budget situation, Treasurer Denise Nappier has informed the governor: “For several months I have reported reduced cash levels for the state, particularly within the common cash pool that funds daily operations and circumstances now warrant a contingency plan for ensuring adequate cash resources.” Because of technicalities in state budgeting rules, Comptroller Kevin Lembo’s office could not count the emergency budget cuts ordered by Malloy; in his latest report, Lembo officially certified a $415 million deficit, though he acknowledged that the actual shortfall is probably closer to $290 million.[2] Whenever the comptroller’s office certifies a deficit larger than 1 percent of the general fund ($19.14 billion), state law requires the governor to submit a plan to the legislature. The current threshold is such that it will trigger the statutory requirement, forcing Malloy to present a plan to the General Assembly in special session.[3]

The comptroller attributes much of the shortfall to an increase in Medicaid spending. “Medicaid — the largest single gross appropriation line-item in the budget — is significantly above the budget target,” Lembo said. “Caseload growth continues in the low-income adult program area with the addition of more than 4,000 clients since the start of the fiscal year” causing “double-digit increases [which trend into] this fiscal year, according to data from the Department of Social Services.” Lembo adds that “The fiscal year 2013 budget relied on over $100 million from Medicaid program savings initiatives, many of which have not been implemented to date.” [4]

Rather than raising taxes from the outset, Governor Malloy has made cuts across nearly every agency request that has come his way, and has mandated the adoption of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) “In order to improve the state’s accountability for its use of public funds.” Executive Order No. 1, which directed the Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management (OPM) to initiate a process intended to result in the implementation of GAAP, was his first act upon taking office. [5] Malloy has faced criticisms by labor and citizenry for his cuts, but they have come, thus far, on the revenue side, without an increase in taxes. “First we downsized government. Then we cut spending. Then we identified what we need to ask state employees to do. Only when those three processes were complete did we begin to look at revenue.”[6][7]

REFERENCES

[1] http://www.senatedems.ct.gov/Budget.php

[2] http://www.ctmirror.org/story/18344/nappier-seeks-emergency-550m-loan-help-state-pay-its-bills

[3] http://www.ctmirror.org/story/18340/comptroller-raises-deficit-estimate-50-million

[4] http://www.ctmirror.org/story/18340/comptroller-raises-deficit-estimate-50-million

[5] http://www.ct.gov/opm/cwp/view.asp?a=2998&q=477452

[6] http://www.governor.ct.gov/malloy/cwp/view.asp?A=11&Q=474024

[7] http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/budget/2012_midterm_budget/pdfs/fy2013_sectiona.pdf

Congressional Budget & Impoundment Control Act of 1974

Overview of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974

The Congressional Budget Act (CBA) has been the foundation of U.S. federal budgeting since 1974. The Act shifted budgetary control away from the Executive to the Legislature; curbing encroachment of the Office of the President upon the rights and purpose of Congress.[1] The text of the Constitution establishes Congress as the body with controlling power over the federal budget wherein only Congress has the power to levy taxes or borrow against the credit of the U.S.  Article I, Section 9 prohibits the drawing of funds from the Treasury without an appropriation by law.

The Executive Office gained power over a number of maneuvers, beginning in the 1800s to compensate for increased government spending and the ability of congressional committees to line-item manage hundreds of millions of dollars in appropriations.  “The increased size of the government combined with the increased presidential powers would be identified by Arthur Schlesinger “Imperial Presidency”.  Eventually, this resulted in fiscal conflict with Congress, in the “Seven Year Budget War” waged by President Nixon until 1974.

Spending in social programs had been on the rise with congressional approval, coupled with an ‘incursion’ abroad in Southeast Asia led to rising deficits. Nixon entered into office inheriting a fiscally troubled government… with the continuing rise in entitlement spending and the lack of sufficient economic growth to sustain an enlarging federal government weighing heavily on the budget.” In his approach to mitigate this issue, Nixon “made decisions which alienated Congress … and his actions greatly contributed to the crisis in the government which eventually necessitated the 1974 act.”[2]

An Act to establish a new congressional budget process; to establish Committees on the Budget in each House; to establish a Congressional Budget Office; to establish a procedure providing congressional control over the impoundment of funds by the executive branch; and for other purposes.[3][4]

Title X of the law, also known as the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, specifies that the President may propose to Congress that funds be rescinded. If both the Senate and the House of Representatives have not approved a rescission proposal (by passing legislation) within 45 days of continuous session, any funds being withheld must be made available for obligation.[5]

Congress is not required to vote on such a proposal and has ignored most Presidential requests thus; effectively removed the historical Presidential power of impoundment, replacing it with a program whereby the president was required to propose to Congress the rescission of specific funding proposals. [6] Many Presidents and government officials have called for more Executive leverage to rescind Congressional spending since implementation of the Act. [7]  I personally believe that the topic of presidential, top-level, impoundment is an important notion to consider, of course, under requisite oversight of appropriately determined ‘checks and balances’.

 

[1] Wikipedia: Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974;

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Budget_and_Impoundment_Control_Act_of_1974

[2] Lee, Nooree, Harvard Law School Federal Budget Policy, Briefing Paper No. 34; “Congressional Budget and

Impoundment Control  Act of 1974, Reconsidered” http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/BudgetActRevisited_34.pdf

[3] Wikipedia; ibid.

[4] Lee, Nooree;  ibid.

[5] http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/02C17B.txt

[6] Lee, Nooree;  ibid.

[7] Wikipedia: Impoundment; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impoundment

Racial Profiling Data Collection in CT

Rather, the “Shortcomings of Racial Profiling Data Collection in Connecticut”

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Enacted in Connecticut on the first day of January in the year 2000, following a wave of racial profiling legislation throughout the country, the Penn Act, like the laws passed in other states, relies on the collection of data to spot trends in traffic stops. There are items of the Act that are taken for granted; the cooperation of state police agencies to be compliant with the law and the analysis of submitted data to be reported in the manner proscribed. Thus far, the majority of Connecticut police departments are non-compliant and the collected data sits on shelves, in various slips of papers bound by rubber-band, un-analyzed.  There is another serious question about the data collection itself—can offending officers be relied upon to report accurate profiling data when they fill out the form based on their perceptions?  The Penn Act is a start to correcting discriminatory police tactics, but its shortcomings need to be addressed—otherwise the law is a waste of even the half-effort put toward its enforcement—and a failure at ensuring the protected rights of  State residents.

The most troubling aspect one finds when researching the Penn Act is the unwillingness of the Connecticut police departments to comply with State Statute.  According to their 2008 Annual Report, the African-American Affairs Commission (AAAC), the agency charged with analyzing the profiling data, “barely twenty-five percent of the required law enforcement agencies…submitted reports” in that year.  You would figure that the State’s police departments—the lawkeepers of the land—would have a compliancy rating of better than 25%, especially on a highly publicized issue.   Telling is the fact that Hartford’s urban police forces are among the departments that do not submit data.  There is quickness to dismiss the fact that racial profiling even occurs at all.  According to many officers, the issue instead is “a myth,” and if discriminatory intent was perceived, then it was the lack respect towards the peace officer, or probability of criminal cause that led to the police encounter.  There are many thousands of individuals who claim otherwise, and “driving while black” continues to remain a popular phrase, due to its prevalence in daily urban life.  Departments need to work within the law.  Only then, will they receive the respect they claim they aren’t given.

Another failing of the Act is that it doesn’t designate an “official” form or format for the data collection.    According to the AAAC, the data that had been submitted was “received electronically while others were received in several paper formats.”  I have witnessed this first-hand in meetings with AAAC Executive Director Glen Cassis, who when asked about the way the data is collected, left the room and came back with bundles of scraps of papers…of different size, color, font, etc.  Some of the handwriting was impossible to make out on the forms, which dated back (at least as far as I could see) to 2002.  The cost that the AAAC cites as a hindrance in the analysis of this data comes solely from making sense of this jumbled mess.  Sifting through the piles of bundled papers made me realize the need for a uniform method of data collection—starting with the form.  “Some of them come on slips of paper, some on disc . . . some of it’s coded . . . it comes in various shapes and sizes, and it’s difficult to do any kind of comprehensive report,” says Cassis.  Why is paper even used, considering the amount invested in patrol car computers?  Is the data collection issue something that can be solved by Scantron?  Speaking of bubble forms, can’t the analysis and reporting be completed by college students, as has been suggested by State Representative Michael Lawlor?  If the State tells an agency to get something done and they don’t provide the money, they should, at the least, supply ideas on making the process cost effective.

When discussing the Penn Act with other activists and community members, they are astonished that data is even collected in the first place.  The first question many people have asked is “who collects the data?” When told that is the officer who makes the traffic stop, their immediate concern is whether or not an officer who engages in profiling would self-report their own criminal activity.  A good point is also made that officers aren’t necessarily trained to interpret race.  Oftentimes, the ticket that is received is riddled with errors regarding the officers presumed interpretation of race (or religion in some cases, in the states that track that data)—sometimes even gender is inaccurately recorded.  An immediate question is “who is to say…” that the data the officer reports—unseen by the person being pulled over—has accurately been recorded.  This model of data collection carries many fallacies, which, like probable cause (“what is probable cause?”), leave much to interpretation.  What exactly is “officer’s presumption” and what options, if any, are available to individuals who believe they have been racially profiled?

Beyond reporting of the data, there are no ways to spot profiling, accept by anecdote, and then by lawsuits brought by the American Civil Liberties Union and the State Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities.  Of these cases, usually only the “surest” go to trial. While they grab attention from the media, they drawn out, and in the course of the wait, a person sometimes suffers from lost employment because of a traffic incident in which they may have been profiled (ex. truck drivers).  There is no immediate recourse available to the victim in this case.  To help overcome this inequity, municipalities in other states such as Oregon and California have requested that the officer’s business card be presented at each traffic stop.  The hope would be to keep the offending officer less likely to engage in profiling, for fear of recrimination by the persons they pull over.  It seems a cheap enough addition to range of alternatives, though there are complaints about the cost of paper.  A less costly method might be to print a line on the bottom of the ticket:  “Do you believe you have been racially profiled?  Tell your story @ www.XYZ.”  The “hotline” webpage could serve as either a un- or low-funded forum simply to broadcast the issue, or as part of a state agency or non-profit organization (hopefully this time, funded).  Academia could well step in, and leave the running of the site to those studying web-design; and the handling of the legal matters to professors, advocates, and those pursuing a law degree.  Fixing the problem of racial profiling doesn’t have to be a slow or expensive process.

The issue of racial profiling first needs acknowledgement by the State’s police forces.  The reality is that racial profiling is not the myth that they have made it out to be.  Rather than dismissing the idea of it, or spinning it to be a “lack of officer respect” outlook on the part of the citizen, police agencies should own up to their role in this ordeal.  If they wish to handle the problem of profiling internally, as is the current “strategy,” those efforts must show results—to the satisfaction of the community that they serve. The police must be compliant with the law they are charged with keeping.  There must be championing on this issue, politically and in the community, to pressure this wrong to be righted.  A failed, yet expansive, racial profiling law shows poor leadership thus far in that regard. Rather than continue with the chaos of the current system, the will to accomplish the intention of the Penn Act is within reach, and needs the support of police leadership and elected officials.  Instead of taking an adversarial approach with this issue, the onus is on them to cooperate with the community and move beyond this discriminatory, archaic idea.  Simple steps, some of which are proposed in this document, are low-cost, “low-hanging” approaches that can be implemented to both curb racial profiling and provide a form of recourse to the individual affected by the practice.

VAT Tax: Better Than Current Model

Andrew Mancini & Daniel Malo

1 October 2012

Value Added Tax

 Introduction

American Exceptionalism has been part of United States history since our victory over The British in The Revolutionary War.  America has always aspired to set the global standard in everything it does.  When it comes to the tax system however, America is behind the rest of the world.  The United States heavily relies on taxing income to raise revenues and the only significant taxes on consumption are at the state level.  Most countries have some form of a value added tax (VAT), generally accepted as the best form of consumption tax, which provides many benefits over the income tax. The VAT is better for businesses and could promote more production here in the United States while at the same time, level the playing field with foreign companies here and abroad.  The VAT is also more efficient and better at capturing revenues from people that have an ability to pay when compared to the income tax in place now.  This paper will focus on discussing the benefits of a value added tax when compared to the current income tax system but will also address some of the weakness with the tax and attempt to show that they are not that significant.

Better for Business

A VAT provides a significant advantage for countries in global trade.  The VAT is most beneficial because of its border adjustability.  The tax is subtracted from exports and added to imports (Haimowitz 4:30).  “A VAT works like an export subsidy for foreign exporters and an import tariff at the same time,” (Economyincrisis.org).    A good example of how the VAT affects trade is described in a video on Taxreform.org.  A $50,000 dollar car is produced in Germany and about to be shipped to China.  Upon leaving Germany, the 19% VAT in Germany is returned to the car manufacturer, making the price of the car $42,000.  When the car reaches China, the 17% value added tax in China is assessed on the car making the price for sale in China $49,000 (Haimowitz 5:50).  This example shows the advantages of the VAT.  Without it, the German car would cost $58,500 in China.

Since the United States has a corporate income tax and its trading partners operate with a VAT, the United States is at a major competitive disadvantage in global trade.  “The U.S. corporate income tax tends to decrease exports and increase imports (by definition, therefore, hurting U.S. trade competitiveness)” (Nicholson p26).  As it currently stands, over 150 nations use the value added tax (Economyincrisis.org).  The United States is the only OECD country that does not have some form of a VAT (Nicholson p2).  For the most part, this covers every country that the United States trades with.  As it stands, there are no tax deductions for products being exported from the United States but these same products will be hit with a foreign countries VAT when they arrive there (Haimowitz 6:50).  “The VAT ranges from 5% in Canada and Japan to over 16% in China, Mexico, Spain, Italy, and the UK” (Haimowitz 7:05).  This makes U.S. products more expensive.  At the same time, imports coming into the United States from other countries receive a tax rebate equivalent to that country’s value added tax rate.  Upon arrival in the United States, there is no value added tax placed on these imports by the United States, giving imports a price advantage over U.S. produced goods (Haimowitz 6:50).

This system provides a competitive advantage to foreign countries.  United States companies have been paying while companies in countries with a VAT in place have been saving.  “In 2006, foreign nations collected VAT rebates totaling $218.2 billion while American companies were forced to pay $122.4 billion in taxes due to the VAT.  Each year the VAT imposes an average of $290 billion burden on our goods exported and another $85 billion on services,” (Economyincrisis.org).  Under this system, United States companies are outsourcing in order to avoid the disadvantages of producing in the United States.  At the same time, the United States is a less attractive place for foreign companies to produce goods.  A VAT in the United States could help with keeping jobs here and increase the advantages to producing in the United States.  With a national unemployment rate of 8.3% and the current national debt of over 16 trillion dollars, it is something to strongly consider.

More Money In Your Pocket

The VAT is foremost about paying a tax on goods consumed, rather than paying that tax through deductions from income. It can be favorable to the consumer in that they might notice more net income in their paycheck, possibly encouraging personal savings but also increasing one’s fluid spending ability. These two positives externalities of the VAT have the potential to assist contemporary (and timeless) concerns of retirement savings and economic vibrancy, by offering stronger personal savings stewardship and more spending ability in the local economy. The VAT can possibly be an economic engine, and necessary for a stable economy, hedged across the spectrum of taxable consumer purchases; foremost, it puts more money in people’s pocket, saved or spent, either is an investment.

Of course, these potentials come only in lieu of lowering or removing income and corporate taxes, in favor of a ‘light’ or total VAT system.  A system as such would allow for more spending by companies, as well as making them more competitive with other VAT countries. The ‘lost’ taxes could then allow for the phase-in of consumption taxes, generating revenue on increased purchases. Even a slow adoption of the taxation model would reward handsomely and make our current tax structure closer to parity. For example, in 2009 the United States imported $1.9 trillion worth of consumer goods. A nominal VAT of just 10 percent could have raised $190 billion from those imports.

Uncle Sam Needs You!

The VAT captures a consumer’s ability to pay by levying a consumption tax on goods that might otherwise go untaxed. Under a VAT system everyone would pay into the ‘pool’ with every purchase. It can theoretically be applied across all types of purchases, such as homes, cars, computers, and exotic goods; there are ethical considerations to be made regarding items of human necessity. The VAT can simplify tax structure for all parties, easing the burden, cost and size of tax administration and enforcement. Rather than a system of deductions, subsidies, and rebates; corporate accounting and loopholes, the VAT proposes a more efficient revenue collection scheme.

Under our current income tax structure, many people make no tax contribution, such as students, tourists, or workers in the country illegally. This gives equity to the system by inducing their participation in reciprocity for receiving many of the benefits that others’ income taxes pay for.  There is less ‘deadweight’ in the financing of public spending, HOWEVER when implementing policy, we should remain cognizant of the real economic burden on those groups, so that they aren’t ‘outpriced’ from purchases. If the rate of taxation is not ‘fair’ it will be unworkable by intrusion of underground economies and decreased purchasing, and only serve to the detriment of the policy.

Weaknesses

The Value Added Tax is a form of consumption tax.  The main problem with consumption taxes is that they are both horizontally and vertically unequal.  The vertical equity problem is that it would be a regressive tax by nature.  The lower a family’s income, a higher proportion of their income will have to be spent on consumption goods.  This means that lower income families will pay a higher proportion of their income to taxes.  In general this is not a good thing.  There are measures that can be taken to reduce the regressive nature of the tax.  No tax on food and water is a good start.  Also, lower tax rates could be placed on items that are essential for households such as kitchen appliances.  At the same time, higher tax rates can be enforced on luxury goods such as expensive clothing, fancy cars, or jet skis.

The horizontal equity problem is that tax rates amongst people with the same ability to pay can be different based on lifestyle.  With a consumption tax, a person that saves more will pay fewer taxes than a person who likes to spend a lot of money.  We can conclude from this that a consumption tax would encourage people to save and invest which is not necessarily a bad thing.  For example, Social Security cannot provide enough income for people when they retire.  If Americans save more money under the VAT, it will reduce some of the pressures on the Social Security system, a big problem for our country right now.

 

Conclusion

The Value Added Tax has the potential to be an economic catalyst for our country when properly implemented. It would better leverage American companies to compete against foreign VATS levied nearly everywhere else in the world. It would keep more cash for spending or savings for the individual and their local and state economies. The VAT keeps taxation equitable and collective. Acknowledging the regressive-ness inherent in the tax, attempts could be made at the taxation of the most expensive and most copious products, again, capturing an individual or company’s ability of means to pay. That the United States is not working with a highly effective VAT system, wherein the rest of the world does, can remind one of our stubbornness to accept the global measuring standard, the metric system–in favor of the Imperial approach. Folks familiar with that issue might recall a NASA blunder where our measuring errors were responsible for a multi-billion dollar Mars mission failure. Similar to our healthcare system,  our global neighbors, and our stagnation towards a universal single-payer delivery and management program which would bring equitability and parity to our ‘American Exceptionalism Dream’. We should embrace all of these approaches, especially concepts like the VAT, and we must also make them our own, because they are practical and fair, and would make that vision closer to reality.

 

Works Cited

Class Notes
Economyincrisis.org.  “Value Added Tax (VAT)”.  Economy In Crisis.  Web. 29 September 2012

Haimowitz, Sara.  “Value Added Tax (VAT): Fair Trade, Jobs & Growth”.  17 August 2012.  Online Video Clip.  Trade Reform.  29 September 2012

Nicholson, Michael W.  “Value-Added Taxes and U.S. Trade Competitiveness”.  Forum for Research In Empirical International Trade.  July 2010.  Web.  29 September 2012

USA: Backup for Afghan Drug Lords

RAWA: Since 2001 the opium cultivation increased over 4,400%. Under the US/NATO, Afghanistan became world largest opium producer, which produces 93% of world opium.

RAWA: Since 2001 the opium cultivation increased 4,400%. Under the US/NATO, Afghanistan became world largest opium producer, producing 93% of world opium.

In his article In Bed with Warlords, Walter Russell Mead discusses the New York Times drug trafficking allegations and CIA connections of Ahmed Wali Karzai, brother of Afgani President, Hamid Karzai.  The allegations should come as no surprise, Mead says, when considering the warlords that America has to deal with in Afghanistan.  He believes that in a “country that’s been involved in chaotic civil and international conflicts for thirty years, the people who have scrambled to the top of the bloody heap are unsavory.”  Because of the power structure in Afghanistan, the United States has been forced into “cutting dirty deals with nasty people.” If not one set of corrupt Afghan officials, we’d “working with other Afghans who’ve clawed their way to the top in the same murderous scrum that gave us the Karzais.”  Mead feels that “whether we stick with the Karzais or find another clan to back, we are going to be forking out a lot of money to a lot of shady types.”  He doesn’t see any way around this; that American forces need allies in the region.  “In Afghanistan there are bad guys who, maybe, we can work with, and bad guys who, definitely, don’t want to work with us.  If we could afford to leave the crummy place alone and let it go to hell in its own way, we would have done that long ago.”

But are we forced into these deals?  Mead is resigned to the status quo; he brings up the standard litany of hawkish reasons for the presence of US troops…with almost nonchalant treatment to the subject of the opium trafficking itself.[1]  The heroin is definitely part of the problem, as Jeremy Hammond of Foreign Policy Journal reports.  Afghanistan supplies 90 percent of the world’s opium and it would be foolish to treat that fact lightly, considering the players along the money trail.  He cites a newly announced US strategy for combating the drug problem: “placing drug traffickers with ties to insurgents —and only drug lords with ties to insurgents — on a list to be eliminated.”  There is a vicious double standard in this, according to Hammond; “the vast majority of drug lords…are explicitly excluded as targets under the new strategy…to put it yet another way, the U.S. will be assisting to eliminate the competition for drug lords allied with occupying forces or the Afghan government; assistance which could theoretically help people like the Karzais “to further corner the market.”[2]

Drug dealing is also easier when you have someone else to take the punishment.  Although 97 percent of the drug trade in Afghanistan is controlled by traffickers other than the insurgents, the insurgents still get blamed. In The Poppy Trail, Reese Erlich says that the “mainstream media largely ignored…government officials…instead spreading the myth that the Taliban controlled most of the drug trade.” There have been numerous instances of drug corruption throughout the Afghan government; former Defense Minister Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim, Karzai’s vice presidential candidate, “shipped his heroin to Russia in a government cargo plane, which then returned stuffed with cash” while Ahmed Wali Karzai has “taken control of the heroin trade in Kandahar.” And while the US government and Afghani officials have given lip service to curbing the spread of opium, they continue to place blame mostly on the Taliban.[3]  The $70 million that the Taliban make every year from opium only accounts for two percent of estimated profits from the Afghan drug trade; the other drug lords make almost $3.4 billion.  Before 9/11, the Taliban were allies in the American war on drugs and were “actually awarded…for its effective reduction of the drug trade,” receiving “$43 million for its anti-drug efforts.”[4]

The reason that our troops are in Afghanistan should be put more succinctly to the American public.  If the true purpose of our presence in Afghanistan is to assist in a particular warlord’s monopolization of the heroin trade, then it must be announced in the interests of transparency; otherwise, it needs to be refuted outright, with evidence to support that claim.  The fact that the heroin trade has escalated since 9/11 on our watch and after our puppet was installed, cannot be denied.  American leaders must accept responsibility for their complicity in allowing the world’s prime source of heroin to grow.  They should not blindly holler “9/11,”“women’s rights,” and “democracy” as justification for lingering in Afghanistan. These buzzwords have been grossly misrepresented and are used to sell an idea of the country that isn’t grounded in reality.  The real issue at play is the control of the heroin trade and it is that truth that should be acknowledged in the media.  Mead suggests we “drop the phony outrage over the CIA hiring a suspected drug dealer in Kabul’s first family.” This is something that our intelligence service was probably most intimately aware of, and an issue worthy of mainstream attention.  Mead is correct in his observations that the Karzai/opium connection’s exposure in the media might serve to straighten out the Afghani government. He suggests that we use the press to put “all the pressure we can on the people now wretchedly misgoverning Afghanistan in order to get them to be a little less sickeningly corrupt and incompetent.”[5]   It should go further than that, with the American people asking about their own government’s motives:  Considering how we have knowingly and tacitly supported the Karzai family’s connection to the opium trade, what are our intentions, first, with the Karzais, and second, all the opium?  Why do the poppies continue to grow under a Karzai regime, when, just a decade ago, the United States was paying the Taliban millions of dollars to eradicate it?

[1] Walter Russell Mead, “In Bed with Warlords,” The Daily Beast, 28 October 2009. (accessed 19 November 2009) http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-10-28/our-dangerous-liaisons/full/

[2] Jeremy R. Hammond,Ex-ISI Chief Says Purpose of New Afghan Intelligence Agency RAMA Is ‘to destabilize Pakistan’,” Foreign Policy Journal, 12 August 2009.  (accessed 19 November 2009) http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/08/12/ex-isi-chief-says-purpose-of-new-afghan-intelligence-agency-rama-is-%E2%80%98to-destabilize-pakistan%E2%80%99/

[3] Reese Erlich, “On the Poppy Trail,” The Progressive, November Edition. (accessed 19 November 2009) http://www.progressive.org/erlich1109.html

[4] Hammond
[5] Mead

Image and more:

http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/10/15/how-deeply-is-the-u-s-involved-in-the-afghan-drug-tradeo.html#ixzz3LXFnKFhV

Change by Legislature – CT Decrim

Change by Legislature (and Legislative Resource)

Cannabis Decriminalization in Connecticut as a template

Prior to 2011, there had been numerous attempts in the State of Connecticut to remove the criminal penalties attached to cannabis possession. The majority of these proposed bills focused mostly on the legalization of medical cannabis, for which a bill was first passed in 1981. Implementation of the law was never worked out, and it the law itself atrophied, until the late 1990s, when ‘medical marijuana’ became a mainstay issue of Committee hearings, but not up for Assembly vote until its passage ‘again’ in 2012.[1] While the efforts of medical cannabis legalization have ran parallel to criminal justice reforms, it is the intention of this report to focus solely on decriminalization efforts put forth by the State Legislature.

Connecticut’s ‘Decrim’ story is regarded as a new and special case, by policy makers in that the Connecticut legislature was the mechanism for policy change, rather than ballot provision, for the first Decrim by legislature since Alaska in 1975. Undoubtedly our attempts were bolstered by Massachusetts decriminalizing adult possession by a voter referendum in 2008, but employed in Connecticut was is different, and hitherto, unsuccessful for over two decades across the country in all its attempts. Victory via this procedure proved itself a catalyst for similar change in neighboring states, with the Rhode Island (successfully), and New Jersey (Governor veto) following suit in 2012.

After a dormant, ‘tough on crime’ 1980s, the issue was resurrected with Proposed Bill 815;  referred to the Judiciary Committee of the Connecticut General Assembly in the legislative session of 1995.  This bill sought to decrease the penalty for possession of less than one ounce of cannabis by labeling it an infraction.  Individuals found in possession of cannabis would be “guilty of a violation and be fined fifty dollars.”[2] Two years later, a more comprehensive Raised Bill 6991 would come out of the Judiciary Committee.  Among many proposed substitutions and deletions revising State drug policy, this bill sought to decrease penalties for cannabis possession. The objectives of the bill were, first, to determine “substance use, abuse and dependency in the state, client and patient demographics and crime and criminal justice efforts.”  One of the benefits of this approach was that it began to make use of the state’s power to research this issue for policy change.

This bill started a new effort in gathering data for the purpose of policy reform.  Prior to this bill, the issue of cannabis was largely considered a moral political battle.  Raised Bill 6991 looked at the reality of the situation, acknowledging it as a health and judicial “problem.”  The bill also examined the use of prevention, treatment, intervention and education services as alternatives to incarceration and the use of criminal justice resources to address substance use and abuse. Also in the bill was language which questioned the appropriateness, quality and cost effectiveness of substance abuse services (including incarceration) administered by the Judicial Department.[3]  In 2003, legislation was proposed which looked to reduce penalties for simple cannabis possession. Proposed Bill 356 suggested that the penalty for possession of less than four ounces be an infraction, rather than a misdemeanor offense.[4] Another proposed bill that year, 5260, would have made possession punishable by a fine of $150 for a first offense and an additional $100 for each subsequent violation. Neither bill would be raised.[5]

Attempts at decriminalization would be made in 2009 and 2010 with SB 349 and SB 476, both times on estimates that “doing so could save the state more than $11 million in law enforcement costs annually because far fewer people would be sent to state Superior Court to be overseen by prosecutors and probation officials…If marijuana users were issued a ticket that could be paid by mail, they would no longer need to go to court.”[6] Again like the others before it, these bills would die in committee. The legislative language of SB 349 was added to the slate of Cannabis bills in 2011, brought back to life as SB 1014, and with unprecedented activist and legislative support, passed its committee vetting, was voted on favorably in both chambers and signed by the Governor and took effect: 1 July, 2011. [7]

Final approval of this legislation accepts the reality that the current law does more harm than good – both in the impact it has on people’s lives and the burden it places on police, prosecutors and probation officers of the criminal justice system –

Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy

Decriminalization is hardly a new issue—During the 1970’s there was an effort in many states to decriminalize cannabis possession by imposing a civil fine rather than a criminal penalty. During that time, eleven states dropped criminal penalties. Recently, Nevada and Massachusetts decriminalized simple possession. As well, a number of municipalities have taken steps to decriminalize or “deprioritize” marijuana arrests.  Some states, such as Alaska, have “rolled back” their policies, criminalizing cannabis by referendum after a long period of legalization.  Connecticut was the tenth (or eleventh, by unit of measure) approve the decriminalization of cannabis possession in small amounts[8], and now bills of similar nature are proposed in nearly every state in the country. The biggest ‘sell’ in terms of effective lobbying has been conveying the bottom line numbers to legislators, with the facts and research to put their political opinion to the side. The ability to have the testimony and ‘support’ of the state’s legislative research team and other high-profile researchers was integral to that process.

Harvard University Professor Jeffrey Miron believes that “estimated savings in criminal justice resources is likely the minimum savings that would occur under decriminalization”  He believes that “since most of the assumptions underlying this estimate err on the low side,”[9] there is a potentially large, unknown upside.  While the State might not “win the lottery” in decriminalizing cannabis, all indications point to both cost savings and increased revenue.  To best gauge the possible fiscal impact of decriminalized cannabis in Connecticut, it is helpful to look at the effects of other decriminalization efforts around the United States. One of the strongest arguments, cost-savings, was expressed in the work Professor Miron researched nearby; the “Prop. 2” decriminalization measure in Massachusetts. This research is likely the most reliable, in terms of coverage of fiscal impact, using methodology and data sets similar to that of OFA, and concluded that decriminalization of marijuana in Massachusetts would produce an annual savings in law enforcement resources of approximately $ 29. 5 million based on 2006 data.  Miron found that judges and lawyers generally estimated stand-alone arrests at 40% of marijuana possession arrests in Massachusetts. He also found, like OFA, that 33% was a reasonable estimate of the marijuana arrests that would no longer occur due to decriminalization. He also found that 5. 8% of all arrests in Massachusetts were for marijuana possession. He multiplied this by 33% to get 1.9% as the fraction of all arrests that would not occur and result in a savings of criminal justice resources under decriminalization.[10]

According to a 2010 OFA report reviewing Miron’s work, savings in criminal justice resources had three components: “a reduction in police resources because of the reduced number of arrests; a reduction in prosecutorial and judicial resources because of the reduced number of criminal applications, pre-trial hearings, and trials; and a reduction in correctional resources because of the reduced number of prisoners.” OFA notes that Miron found that only the first category was likely to be substantially affected by decriminalization due to the low numbers of people incarcerated solely for marijuana possession, which amounted to about 1.9% of the Massachusetts’ budget for police protection.  It is on that figure that Miron determined the $29.5 million figure. He concludes that this estimate may be low for several reasons, including the earlier mentioned assumption that parole and probation rules will stay the same.[11]

The City of Seattle adopted ballot initiative “I-75” in 2003. The initiative mandated that “the police department and city attorney’s office make the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of marijuana offenders the city’s lowest enforcement priority when the marijuana is intended for adult personal use.” Studied by University of Washington Professors, Beckett and Herbert, the two recently crafted a report which discusses the consequences and costs of marijuana prohibition. Their report concludes that “there were reductions in the number of referrals of marijuana-related incidents from the police department to the city attorney and also a reduction in people charged with marijuana possession by the city attorney, after I-75’s adoption.”[12]

The California decriminalization effort is discussed in a 1988 study published in the Journal of Psychoactive Drugs. Prior to the enactment of the Moscone Act in 1976, ¼ of the felony arrests in California were for marijuana, costing the state $100 million annually to process marijuana offenders. The act reduced possession of small amounts of marijuana from a felony to a new type of misdemeanor. The study’s authors, Aldrich and Mikuriya, concluded that California saved at least $ 1 billion between 1976 and 1986 as a result of this change. However, this study discusses the savings associated with “de-felonization” rather than outright decriminalization of cannabis.” [13]
Using metrics similar to Miron’s, the Office of Fiscal Analysis (OFA) showed that there were 9,928 marijuana arrests in Connecticut in 2007, representing 7.0% of total arrests statewide.  The OFA concluded that approximately 33% of those arrests were for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana.  In their findings, OFA saw an estimated 2.3% of total law enforcement resources statewide currently allocated to crimes of cannabis possession. The agency posited a “theoretical savings to state and local law enforcement agencies…estimated to be $9.4 million, resulting from savings associated with police officers no longer having to process arrests for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana.” More likely, this will free up resources for other police actions according to OFA, which concluded that a “savings in this amount may not be realized by state and local law enforcement budgets due to the fact that resources would most likely be reallocated, rather than eliminated.”[14] Besides the potential cost savings, decriminalization would have a positive public safety impact in that it diverts resources from the enforcement of a non-violent crime to other crimes of more pressing importance.

Criminalized cannabis can be shown to pose a cost burden on the courts as well.  Data given in 2009 by OFA estimates a smaller number of Judicial cases under CGS 21a‑279(c).  They approximate 3,200 prosecutions (suspiciously down from the 9,700 in the 2005 data).  With these numbers, OFA assumes “that possession of less than 1 ounce of marijuana accounts for ¼ of these cases, then the annual cost to process them is estimated to be $400,000, including the salaries of 1 Public Defender, 2 State’s Attorneys, a portion of 1 Judge and support staff, expenses and fringe benefits.”  If using their 2005 statistics, the savings potentially exceeds $1,000,000.

Obviously, along with cost burdens of cannabis criminalization on enforcement agency and courts, there is a large fiscal impact on the State prison system.  OFA, using 2009 data found that there were 57 inmates serving a sentence where the controlling charge is CGS 21a-279(c) (possession of less than four ounces of marijuana).  At the time of the data collection, an additional 17 offenders were being held pretrial.  The OFA then worked with the Miron metrics to conclude that “possession of less than one ounce of marijuana accounts for ¼ of these individuals, and assuming an average cost of $44,895 per year per inmate (including employee fringe benefit costs) the resulting savings would be $831,000 per year.”[15] These figures average $121 per day, having risen since 2003 when estimates by the Department of Corrections and the Office of Fiscal Analysis concluded $76 and $96, respectively.[16]  These numbers will theoretically rise higher over time with inflation, further increasing costs to the State and taxpayer.

Savings could also be realized in the 1,300 probationers under supervision in the community who were convicted of possession of less than 4 ounces of marijuana as their primary charge.  In particular, the estimate assumes no trials on charges of marijuana possession and no prison terms due to marijuana possession.  The estimate presented here takes as given that current rules regarding parole and probation would remain in effect under decriminalization.  Under current rules, Miron notes, “regarding parole and probation, a positive urine test for drugs can send a parolee or probationer to prison, regardless of the original offense…these rules might change under legalization, implying additional reductions in government expenditure.”[17]  Miron also believes that “it is plausible these rules would be relaxed under decriminalization. This would keep non-trivial numbers of parolees and probationers out of prison, with substantial savings for the government budget.[18] The OFA again assumes that “possession of less than 1 ounce of marijuana accounts for ¼ of these individuals” and “the estimated, annual cost to supervise these offenders in the community is $424,000, including probation officer salaries, fringe benefits, expenses and contracted services.  Again, these are conservative estimates, and the potential savings rises greatly, depending on the data used and the interpretation thereof.

‘Armed’ with knowledge, the fiscal argument was finally  proven compelling enough to be given favorable treatment in a legislature; a trend developed in isolation of Drug Policy Organizations and high profile ballot campaigns, creating a fifth column of support, consisting of compassionate and informed citizen legislators.  With Connecticut as a template for other states to achieve policy change, the model can be transferred, rapidly to other legislatures, until prohibition is merely a topic for history (again).  Thus far, nearly every state has, at the very least, broached the subject of cannabis decriminalization in the committees of their legislatures.  Decriminalization—and now legalization, bolstered by victorious ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington—are popular subjects that get mentioned both by word of mouth, and in the media. As well, this issue has come to affect everyone, or at the very least, someone they know. Cannabis is the most popular illegal substance, with nearly 42% of the population estimated to be experimenting with it in their lifetime.  Proponents argue that decriminalization and eventual legalization are measures that have become necessary to “right the wrong” caused by prohibition.[19] In today’s budget crisis, regardless of one’s opinion of the drug itself, decriminalization of cannabis is perhaps the simplest legislation with the quickest turn around in cost savings and potential revenue.

[1] http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/06/01/connecticut-gov-signs-nations-most-restrictive-medical-marijuana-bill-into-law/

[2] State of Connecticut, Proposed Bill 815, An Act Concerning Marijuana and Cannabis Type Substances (1995).

[3] State of Connecticut, Raised Bill 6991, An Act Concerning Drug Policy (1997).

[4] State of Connecticut, Proposed Bill 356, An Act Concerning the Penalty for Possession of a Small Amount of Marijuana (2003).

[5] Norman-Eady, Sandra, State of Connecticut, Office of Legislative Resarch. “2004-R-0264  Decriminalization of Marijuana.  February 25, 2004

[6] Keating, Christopher.  Hartford Courant “Judiciary Committee Votes To Decriminalize Marijuana.” March 31, 2009  http://blogs.courant.com/capitol_watch/2009/03/decriminalize-marijuana.html (Accessed April 23, 2010)

[7] http://www.ctmirror.org/story/12857/legislators-send-marijuana-decrim-bill-governor

[8] Norman-Eady, Sandra, State of Connecticut, Office of Legislative Resarch. “94-R-1089  Legalization of Illicit Drugs”  December 22, 1994.

 

[9] Miron, Jeffrey.  Harvard University. “The Effect of Marijuana Decriminalization on the Budgets of Massachusetts Governments” (October, 2008).

[10] Norman-Eady, Sandra, State of Connecticut, Office of Legislative Resarch. “94-R-1089  Legalization of Illicit Drugs”  December 22, 1994.

[11] Soncia Coleman, State of Connecticut, Office of Legislative Research. “Criminal Justice Cost Savings Associated with Marijuana Decriminalization.” February 17, 2010.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[13] Norman-Eady, Sandra, State of Connecticut, Office of Legislative Resarch. “94-R-1089  Legalization of Illicit Drugs”  December 22, 1994. http://www.cga.ct.gov/2010/rpt/2010-R-0052.htm (Accessed April 22, 2010)

[14] Murphy, Michael, Alan Calandro, Christopher Wetzel.  State of Connecticut, Office of Fiscal Analysis. “OFA-1575, Fiscal Impact of reducing the penalty for possession of a small amount of marijuana.” March 23, 2009.

[15] Murphy, Michael, Alan Calandro, Christopher Wetzel.  State of Connecticut, Office of Fiscal Analysis. “OFA-1575, Fiscal Impact of reducing the penalty for possession of a small amount of marijuana.” March 23, 2009.

[16] Wolkoff, Adam, State of Connecticut, Office of Legislative Research.  “2006-R-0113  Marijuana Statistics.” February 6, 2006.

[17] Miron, Jeffrey.  Harvard University. “The Budgetary Implications of Prohibition.”(December, 2008)

[18] Miron, Jeffrey.  Harvard University. “The Effect of Marijuana Decriminalization on the Budgets of Massachusetts Governments” (October, 2008).  http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/miron/files/decrim_update_2007.pdf  (Accessed April 23, 2010)

[19] Norman-Eady, Sandra, State of Connecticut, Office of Legislative Resarch. “94-R-1089  Legalization of Illicit Drugs”  December 22, 1994.

Free the Leaf

Free the Leaf

Eastern Connecticut’s Scenic Byway

Originally published at Global Site Plans

Route 169; Canterbury, Connecticut.  Fall trees line paved road.

The Route 169 National Scenic Byway is located in Eastern Connecticut in the Quinebaug River Valley, and features farms, orchards, and historic inns & homes along its entire length. The right-of-way has been in use since the 1600’s and the colonial houses, old churches, pastures, and stone walls lining the road take you back in time. The rural nature of the route also makes it one of the best New England Fall foliage drives and there is local concern for “Protecting the character of Route 169.”

Starting in the town of Lisbon, Connecticut, the route travels north-south for thirty-two miles through five towns, ending at the Massachusetts border.

The scenic byway begins without a sign, by taking Exit 83A off of 395 Eastbound. The westbound side of the interstate does not service Route 169. The exit deposits you anonymously at 169, however the beat up signs and highway exit litter do not point out the direction of the scenic route. Take a left.  The first sign announcing it is a third of a mile north of the exit. The region could do well to advertise the presence of this scenic route from the interstate.

First Northbound Sign in Lisbon, Connecticut.  Blue sign reads "Scenic Road Next 32 MI." Fall trees line the road.

Route 169 intersects major east-west Routes 14, 6, and 44. The intersections are typically flashing four-way stops, usually the only automated traffic control in any of the towns. The intersection of Route 6 is the sole exception. Near these intersections, signs designate a “Wine Trail;” In the northern towns of Pomfret and Woodstock, cafes and restaurants can be found adjacent to 169.

It’s a road where you can take your time and catch the view while you drive. Occasionally, you’ll pass a classic car show, or an ice cream stand. Unfortunately, there are very few safe spots to pull over. You may encounter a local tail-gaiter in a hurry to get somewhere, or, during the harvest season, you could be stuck behind a tractor. Fortunately, there are clearly marked passing zones.

Route 169 & Route 6 Intersection; Brooklyn, Connecticut

As I have grown up, I’ve seen orchard and farm space disappear, and warehouses and McMansions spring up along Route 169, many of which have a “for sale” sign in front. Perhaps there isn’t a demand for these “out of character” types of land uses along this route.

A nuisance neighbor who decides on a four car garage can rile up a neighborhood every so often, and along the route, there is an occasional junk yard. A rusted bus or two can also be spotted, but they provide character. Garish raised-ranches on what was obviously once a cornfield can make jarring counterpoints to the beauty of the route, but the semi-frequent abandoned and falling barn blends in, without disruption, a pleasant aesthetic fit.

The biggest disruption to the route’s character has to be public road signs and roadside trash upkeep. It seems that only one out of ten signs stands upright, wherein they give the appearance of being litter. Could the signs be mounted to telephone poles? It would certainly make the drive safer and more scenic by removing roadside obstacles. While the towns along Route 169 have ordinances relating to commercial signs, state road safety signs are beyond the town’s purview.

Being a state road, the Connecticut Department of Transportation or the state legislature should revisit rural road sign policies to assist the local preservation effort.

How does state or federal policy impact the character of where you live?

Credits: Images by Dan Malo.  Data linked to sources.