Tag Archives: war

WW1: Spanish Flu Pandemic


The flu pandemic of 1918 is called the Spanish Flu because the Spanish media were the ones reporting it. Coverage of the flu was censored elsewhere, and the Spanish Flu was likely to have started in the United States.

It had a high mortality rate and its victims were usually between the ages of 20 and 40. It also spread quickly, infecting 1/5 of the world’s population. People died from it died very quickly.

The battlefield conditions of WW1 were ideal for the spread of this flu.

The close proximity of soldiers along with the confining nature of trench warfare allowed the spread of the Spanish Flu among beleaguered soldiers. A side effect of war is disease, and the “mass movements of men in armies and aboard ships probably aided in its rapid diffusion.”

Related Post

WW1: Zeebrugge ‘Rush Into Death’

An aerial view of Zeebrugge (1918)

An aerial view of Zeebrugge (1918)

For much of World War One, the German U-Boat reigned supreme on the seas.  Much of these submarines originated from the Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend occupied by the German Navy.  Their proximity to England presented a major hazard to shipping and transportation for the Allies and “Britain’s continuing ability to wage war depended upon blocking the exits from both ports…thus denying German submarines convenient bases.”[1] The plan to raid the two ports was secretly formulated in February 1918 by the British Admiralty with the objectives of; first, taking out a heavily fortified “mole” or jetty at the mouth of Zeebrugge and second, intentionally sinking ships in the harbor to block the port.  The majority of the seventy-five dilapidated ships involved in the operation would be committed to the attack at Zeebrugge, while a smaller force was sent to Ostend with similar intentions.

It was decided to use derelict ships for the operation, and each spent months of overhaul, being scrapped and outfitted for their specific purpose, be it transportation or scuttling.  W. Wainright, a sailor involved in the raid, described the Vindictive, the lead ship used to land troops under cover of smokescreen at the entrance to the Brugges Canal[2], as “an exceedingly unique specimen of warship, there being no comparison to her former days when she had been a pride to all who sailed in her..she had been stripped bare of everything bar the essential parts…she was ugly, as she lay there, a veritable floating fortress, a death-trap fitted with all the ingenious contrivances of war that human brain could think of.”[3] This rag-tag fleet also consisted of ferries, the Iris and Daffodil and other ships, the Thetis, Intrepid, Iphegenia, Sirius, and Brilliant, surrounded by destroyers, and submarines to aid in the attack.[4]

The dangerous trip across the Channel would take ten hours.[5]  Leading up to the raid, few sailors understood the enormity of what they were about to face, according to the memories of Wainwright. “I doubt if any there thought of the serious mission of this strangely assorted fleet…practically everybody snatched an hour or two’s sleep before the fateful zero hour; how anyone could sleep with an adventure like the one before us speaks volumes for the mental and physical fitness of the party.”  When called to their stations, they did so “leisurely as if going to a football match.”  Immediately before the battle,  as Wainwright recalled, “the magnitude of the scheme overwhelmed (them)–the sheer audacity of tackling a place like Zeebrugge under the muzzles of the world-famed Blankenberghe Battery, where a change in the wind or tide at the critical moment would undoubtedly result in the total loss of the expedition.”[6] The attack on Zeebrugge would begin early in the morning of 23 April 1918.

All casualness was left aside, however, as the operation began badly. Unexpected winds would disrupt the effectiveness of the smokescreen that was deployed to cover the troop landing.[7] The diversion that the Vindictive was suppose to provide by taking possession of the mole, became almost all for naught.  The Vindictive took heavy fire from the Germans and moored in the wrong position, causing its guns to be of little use in providing cover fire for the landed troops.  Any ships attempting to enter the harbor would be sitting ducks; the blockships Iphegenia, Intrepid, and Thetis had little time to get into position for sinking. The mole would remain untaken, and German guns were able to disable the blockships, preventing them from scuttling themselves “in their correct pre-assigned locations at the narrow entrance to the canal.”[8]  A submarine, commanded by Lt. Richard Sandford, would ram the mole and cause an explosion which “left a gaping hole 100 feet wide,” lessening the barrage of German guns and buying considerable time for troops to make it to the transport ships.[9]

The chaos of the battle shook those that participated in it.  Wainwright recalled how “all the venom and hatred of the shore batteries seemed concentrated on us…salvo after salvo struck the ship, doing indescribable damage…where all the storming party were awaiting to land…it was hell with a vengeance and it seemed well-nigh miraculous that human beings could live in such an inferno.”  The Germans barrage upon the Vindictive was unrelenting “and the dead and wounded were piled up three or four deep.” However, “the remnants of the platoon staggered through, reorganized, and carried on as though.”  It was “not inspiring,” Wainwright wrote in his diary to see “the youth of England, laughing, cheering, and swearing, rushing into what seemed certain death.” He found it “heart-breaking” to witness such an event, thinking “that in these enlightened days, the youth of the country (were) being butchered in the cause of civilization.”[10]

The “success” of the operation came with a high price tag.  The British suffered approximately 200 fatalities, roughly 500 total casualties in all. Eight Victoria Crosses, the highest British honor for battlefield valor, were awarded.  While the operation at Ostend was considered a failure, the battle at Zeebrugge was presented as “a tremendous British victory by Allied propaganda.” Another attempt would be made a month later at Ostend, but again, fail.  The raid at Zeebrugge, however, “did not in reality hinder German operations from either port for more than a few days.”  Victory was claimed by the Germans who saw themselves as successful in holding both harbors.  Zeebrugge was quickly back in service and it took just a few days for U-boats to make it past the scuttled ships.[11]



Duffy, Michael. “The Raid on Zeebrugge, 1918.” http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/zeebrugge.htm (8 January 2010).

Sandford, Daniel. “Heroes of Zeebrugge.” BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/insideout/southwest/series9/week_four.shtml (8 January 2010).

Wainwright, W. “Memoirs & Diaries – Zeebrugge.” http://www.firstworldwar.com/diaries/zeebrugge.htm (8 January 2010).

[1] Duffy, Michael. “The Raid on Zeebrugge, 1918.” http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/zeebrugge.htm (8 January 2010).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Wainwright, W. “Memoirs & Diaries – Zeebrugge.” http://www.firstworldwar.com/diaries/zeebrugge.htm (8 January 2010).

[4] Ibid.

[5] Sandford.

[6] Wainwright.

[7] Duffy.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Sandford.

[10] Wainwright.

[11] Duffy.

Related Post

WW1: “Over the Top” Determination

British soldiers going over the top, Western Front 1918.

British soldiers going over the top, Western Front 1918.

Most of the Allied force in that battle consisted of eager British volunteers. In one of the bloodiest battles in history, the fact that men kept “going over the top” to a coin toss chance of death against entrenched German forces.

To re-take French land, no less.

This a testament to determination and commitment to what they were fighting for. The Allied troops had poor equipment, little experience, dismal leadership, and clearly lacked the strength and resources had by their enemy…yet they kept going in the face of death, persevered, and changed the tide of WW1.

Related Post

WW1: The Somme Offensive

"The most gigantic, tenacious, grim, futile and bloody fight ever waged in the history of war"

“The most gigantic, tenacious, grim, futile and bloody fight ever waged in the history of war.”

The Somme Offensive was a battle that took place in 1916 during World War One between the German Army and a combined British and French Force.  It occurred on the Somme River in northern France. “Somme” being Celtic for “tranquility,” the battle was anything but that. It is one of the bloodiest engagements on record, resulting in more than 1.5 million casualties.  It was planned by Joseph Joffre, a French General whose retreat and counterattack won the Battle of the Marne for the Allies in 1914 as well as Sir Douglas Haig, a British General.  Part of larger scheme to attack the Central Powers from multiple fronts, the Allies objective in the Somme region was to break through the German line and deliver a decisive blow. The hope was to recapture occupied French towns. The British fought the bulk of Somme Offensive because French troops were mostly committed to protecting Verdun, a French city to the west.[1]

Haig, the commander of the offensive, felt that an artillery bombardment of a million shells, over the course of a week, would demoralize the entrenched German Amy.  Afterwards, Haig believed that Allied forces could overrun the German line, basically walking right through.[2] This false hope was passed on by subordinated commanders to the troops.  However, Haig severely underestimated the level of German preparation for the attack.  The German Army had constructed thirty foot wide trenches, fronted by wire, which would make passage to and beyond the trenches difficult and deadly.  The attack began ten minutes at 7:20 a.m. on 1 July 1916; with the explosion of an allied mine the Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt[3]. Ten minutes after the explosion, the allies advanced.  The Allies fought their way six miles into German occupied France, but failed in achieving their military goals against a well positioned German Army.[4]  On first day of battle, nearly sixty thousand casualties were suffered by the British.  This was the largest number of troops killed or wounded in British history.  Such a loss severely damaged national morale. It was also a tragedy for Newfoundlanders who lost over 700 men, only.[5]

The Somme became one of the largest battles of the war.  It would last until December, and ultimately see the introduction of that tank on the side of the Allies. What happened at the Somme can be seen many ways: as a senseless waste of life; a courageous victory by inexperienced, yet determined volunteers; and, sadly inept leadership by overzealousness and gross underestimation.  Even though the Allies saw great losses, the Somme Offensive can be seen as the beginning of the end for the Central Powers.  The outcome of the battle in the Allies favor would be a precursor to the defeat of the Germany and the end of World War Two.[6]

GuardianUK coverage:


“Battle of the Somme.” Google Video.   http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-6108229046742084686&ei=0klFS43-O5m-qQLDkb3eAQ&q=somme&hl=en&client=firefox-a# (accessed January 6, 2010)

“Battles-the Battle of the Somme, 1916.”  Firstworldwar.com: a multimedia history of world war one. http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/somme.htm (accessed January 6, 2010).

“Newfoundland and the Great War: The Somme, 1916.” Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage. June 2008. http://www.heritage.nf.ca/greatwar/articles/somme.html (accessed January 6, 2010).

Simkins, Peter. Essential Somme: The bloody first day. http://www.essentialsomme.com/articles/first_day_somme_02.htm (accessed January 6, 2010).

[1] “Battle of the Somme.” Google Video.   http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-6108229046742084686&ei=0klFS43-O5m-qQLDkb3eAQ&q=somme&hl=en&client=firefox-a# (accessed January 6, 2010)

[2] “Battles-the Battle of the Somme, 1916.”  Firstworldwar.com: a multimedia history of world war one. http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/somme.htm (accessed January 6, 2010).

[3]  “Battle of the Somme.” Google Video.   http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-6108229046742084686&ei=0klFS43-O5m-qQLDkb3eAQ&q=somme&hl=en&client=firefox-a# (accessed January 6, 2010)

[4] Simkins, Peter. Essential Somme: The bloody first day. http://www.essentialsomme.com/articles/first_day_somme_02.htm (accessed January 6, 2010).

[5] Newfoundland and the Great War: The Somme, 1916.  Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage. June 2008. http://www.heritage.nf.ca/greatwar/articles/somme.html (accessed January 6, 2010)

[6] Ibid.

Topic Report 2  01/06/10


Related Post

USA: Backup for Afghan Drug Lords

RAWA: Since 2001 the opium cultivation increased over 4,400%. Under the US/NATO, Afghanistan became world largest opium producer, which produces 93% of world opium.

RAWA: Since 2001 the opium cultivation increased 4,400%. Under the US/NATO, Afghanistan became world largest opium producer, producing 93% of world opium.

In his article In Bed with Warlords, Walter Russell Mead discusses the New York Times drug trafficking allegations and CIA connections of Ahmed Wali Karzai, brother of Afgani President, Hamid Karzai.  The allegations should come as no surprise, Mead says, when considering the warlords that America has to deal with in Afghanistan.  He believes that in a “country that’s been involved in chaotic civil and international conflicts for thirty years, the people who have scrambled to the top of the bloody heap are unsavory.”  Because of the power structure in Afghanistan, the United States has been forced into “cutting dirty deals with nasty people.” If not one set of corrupt Afghan officials, we’d “working with other Afghans who’ve clawed their way to the top in the same murderous scrum that gave us the Karzais.”  Mead feels that “whether we stick with the Karzais or find another clan to back, we are going to be forking out a lot of money to a lot of shady types.”  He doesn’t see any way around this; that American forces need allies in the region.  “In Afghanistan there are bad guys who, maybe, we can work with, and bad guys who, definitely, don’t want to work with us.  If we could afford to leave the crummy place alone and let it go to hell in its own way, we would have done that long ago.”

But are we forced into these deals?  Mead is resigned to the status quo; he brings up the standard litany of hawkish reasons for the presence of US troops…with almost nonchalant treatment to the subject of the opium trafficking itself.[1]  The heroin is definitely part of the problem, as Jeremy Hammond of Foreign Policy Journal reports.  Afghanistan supplies 90 percent of the world’s opium and it would be foolish to treat that fact lightly, considering the players along the money trail.  He cites a newly announced US strategy for combating the drug problem: “placing drug traffickers with ties to insurgents —and only drug lords with ties to insurgents — on a list to be eliminated.”  There is a vicious double standard in this, according to Hammond; “the vast majority of drug lords…are explicitly excluded as targets under the new strategy…to put it yet another way, the U.S. will be assisting to eliminate the competition for drug lords allied with occupying forces or the Afghan government; assistance which could theoretically help people like the Karzais “to further corner the market.”[2]

Drug dealing is also easier when you have someone else to take the punishment.  Although 97 percent of the drug trade in Afghanistan is controlled by traffickers other than the insurgents, the insurgents still get blamed. In The Poppy Trail, Reese Erlich says that the “mainstream media largely ignored…government officials…instead spreading the myth that the Taliban controlled most of the drug trade.” There have been numerous instances of drug corruption throughout the Afghan government; former Defense Minister Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim, Karzai’s vice presidential candidate, “shipped his heroin to Russia in a government cargo plane, which then returned stuffed with cash” while Ahmed Wali Karzai has “taken control of the heroin trade in Kandahar.” And while the US government and Afghani officials have given lip service to curbing the spread of opium, they continue to place blame mostly on the Taliban.[3]  The $70 million that the Taliban make every year from opium only accounts for two percent of estimated profits from the Afghan drug trade; the other drug lords make almost $3.4 billion.  Before 9/11, the Taliban were allies in the American war on drugs and were “actually awarded…for its effective reduction of the drug trade,” receiving “$43 million for its anti-drug efforts.”[4]

The reason that our troops are in Afghanistan should be put more succinctly to the American public.  If the true purpose of our presence in Afghanistan is to assist in a particular warlord’s monopolization of the heroin trade, then it must be announced in the interests of transparency; otherwise, it needs to be refuted outright, with evidence to support that claim.  The fact that the heroin trade has escalated since 9/11 on our watch and after our puppet was installed, cannot be denied.  American leaders must accept responsibility for their complicity in allowing the world’s prime source of heroin to grow.  They should not blindly holler “9/11,”“women’s rights,” and “democracy” as justification for lingering in Afghanistan. These buzzwords have been grossly misrepresented and are used to sell an idea of the country that isn’t grounded in reality.  The real issue at play is the control of the heroin trade and it is that truth that should be acknowledged in the media.  Mead suggests we “drop the phony outrage over the CIA hiring a suspected drug dealer in Kabul’s first family.” This is something that our intelligence service was probably most intimately aware of, and an issue worthy of mainstream attention.  Mead is correct in his observations that the Karzai/opium connection’s exposure in the media might serve to straighten out the Afghani government. He suggests that we use the press to put “all the pressure we can on the people now wretchedly misgoverning Afghanistan in order to get them to be a little less sickeningly corrupt and incompetent.”[5]   It should go further than that, with the American people asking about their own government’s motives:  Considering how we have knowingly and tacitly supported the Karzai family’s connection to the opium trade, what are our intentions, first, with the Karzais, and second, all the opium?  Why do the poppies continue to grow under a Karzai regime, when, just a decade ago, the United States was paying the Taliban millions of dollars to eradicate it?

[1] Walter Russell Mead, “In Bed with Warlords,” The Daily Beast, 28 October 2009. (accessed 19 November 2009) http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-10-28/our-dangerous-liaisons/full/

[2] Jeremy R. Hammond,Ex-ISI Chief Says Purpose of New Afghan Intelligence Agency RAMA Is ‘to destabilize Pakistan’,” Foreign Policy Journal, 12 August 2009.  (accessed 19 November 2009) http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/08/12/ex-isi-chief-says-purpose-of-new-afghan-intelligence-agency-rama-is-%E2%80%98to-destabilize-pakistan%E2%80%99/

[3] Reese Erlich, “On the Poppy Trail,” The Progressive, November Edition. (accessed 19 November 2009) http://www.progressive.org/erlich1109.html

[4] Hammond
[5] Mead

Image and more:


Related Post